What is a restraining order?
A restraining order is an order that can be issued by a magistrate court judge, which is intended to protect a person's peace, privacy , freedom or body from physical or verbal violence by another person. The main remedy that will be granted as part of an order to prevent threatening harassment is a removal order from the person against whom the application was filed.
A restraining order can be obtained on a one-party basis. After the order is issued, a hearing will be held within 7 days with both sides present, in which it will be decided whether there is a reason to extend the order or cancel it.
Requesting a restraining order is not an appropriate legal procedure if it is violence between family members. In such a case, you should file an application with a family court (and not the magistrate's court), and request a protection order.
When should you apply for a restraining order?
The request for a restraining order should be submitted immediately or very close to the incident of violence (verbal or physical violence). The more time passes, the smaller the chances that the court will grant the request.
The reasoning for this is simple – if time has passed and no other case of violence has occurred, there is probably no need to issue the order.
How do you apply for a restraining order?
A request for a restraining order can be submitted to any magistrate court in Israel. The application must be submitted at the court's secretariat, and the application cannot be submitted via the Internet.
The applicant must list the full details of the person against whom the order is sought:
- full name
- ID
- Address
- phone
Without providing the complete and accurate details, there may be difficulty in complying with the court's decision.
The details are filled out on an application form to receive a restraining order on a one-party basis.
It is very useful to attach relevant documents to the application such as: a copy of a police complaint , photos or videos or audio files that support your claims, medical certificates (if you have suffered physical damage), etc.
For the hearing itself, you should invite witnesses who can support your claims and have seen or heard for themselves how you were harmed or threatened to harm you.
Law on Prevention of Threatening Harassment, 2001 – full text
These are the full provisions of the Law on Prevention of Threatening Harassment:
Purpose
1. The purpose of this law is to protect a person from harm to his peace of life, his privacy, his freedom or his body, at the hands of another person who has taken threatening harassment against him or who has harmed his body.
Threatening harassment – what is it?
2. (a) Threatening harassment is the harassment of a person by another person in any way or making threats towards him, in circumstances that provide a reasonable basis for assuming that the harasser or the threater may return and harm the peace of life, privacy or freedom of the person or that he may harm his body.
(b) Without deviating from the provisions of subsection (a), threatening harassment towards a person may be, among other things, one of the following:
(1) spying, ambushing or tracking his movements or actions, or violating his privacy in any other way;
(2) by making threats to harm him or those who threaten him;
(3) by communicating with him orally, in writing or by any other means;
(4) harming his property, his good name, or his freedom of movement;
(5) In the occupation of guarding in a shared house contrary to the provisions according to the Law on Limiting Security Services in Shared Houses, 2008-2008.
(c) For the purposes of this law, it is one thing if the acts specified in sub-sections (a) or (b) were committed against the person or against another person close to him, either explicitly or implicitly, either directly or indirectly.
Definitions
3. In this law –
"Court" – a peace court, as well as any of the following:
(1) In the case of a victim who is a family member of the perpetrator – also a court and a tribunal authorized to hear according to the law for the prevention of domestic violence;
(2) in the case of an offender or victim who is a minor and a juvenile court hears his case according to the Youth Law (treatment and supervision) – also a juvenile court;
"Juvenile Court" – as defined in the Juvenile Law (Judgment, Punishment and Methods of Treatment), 1971-5771;
"Family member" – as defined in the law for the prevention of domestic violence, and each term in the said definition will be interpreted according to the said law;
"The Youth (Care and Supervision) Law" – The Youth (Care and Supervision) Law, 1960-57;
"Firearms Law" – Firearms Law, 599-1949;
"Law for the Prevention of Domestic Violence" – Law for the Prevention of Domestic Violence, 1991-5771;
"Injured" – a person in whom one of the following occurred:
(1) Threatening harassment was used against him;
(2) he is in danger as specified in section 4(b)(1);
(3) a person may commit a sexual offense in him as mentioned in section 4(b)(1);
(4) an act as mentioned in section 4(b)(2) was committed in him;
And in the case of a victim who is a minor – also the person who is responsible for him according to law;
"Aggressor" – a person who engages in threatening harassment or who meets one of the conditions listed in section 4(b)(1) or (2);
"Order to prevent threatening harassment" – order as stated in section 4(a) or (b);
"Minor" – a person under the age of eighteen;
"Security Authority" – the Israel Police, the Witness Protection Authority, the Knesset Guard as defined in the Law on the House of the Knesset and Its Area, 5578-1968, the Israel Defense Forces, the General Security Service and the Prison Service.
Threatening Harassment Prevention Order
4. (a) If the court finds that a person has resorted to threatening harassment, it may order that person by order to refrain from committing any of the acts specified in section 5(a)(1) to (4), and if it finds that the threatening harassment was carried out under circumstances where there is a fear of harm actual in the peace of another person's life or to continue harm as stated, he may order that person by order to also refrain from the acts listed in section 5(a)(5) and (6).
(b) If the court observes that a person has behaved or harmed another as mentioned in paragraphs (1) or (2), it may order that person by order to refrain from committing any of the acts listed in section 5(a)(1) to (6):
(1) The person's behavior, including behavior as stated in subsection (a), provides a reasonable basis for assuming that he poses an actual physical danger to another person or that he may commit a sexual offense against him;
(2) Immediately before submitting the application, he harmed the body of another person, committed a sexual offense against another person or illegally imprisoned another person.
(c) The provisions of subsections (a) or (b) shall not apply if the court finds that the act for which a threatening harassment prevention order is requested was committed under circumstances that constitute a good defense in a criminal or civil trial due to invasion of privacy, in accordance with the provisions of section 18(2)(b) to (d) or (3) of the Privacy Protection Law, 5741-1981, or in circumstances that constitute an exemption from liability in accordance with the provisions of Section 19 of the aforementioned law.
(d) These may request an order to prevent threatening harassment:
(1) the victim or a person on behalf of the victim;
(2) the Attorney General or his representative;
(3) a police prosecutor;
(4) A social worker appointed according to the Youth (Care and Supervision) Law.
the instructions of the order
5. (a) An order to prevent threatening harassment will prohibit, subject to the provisions of section 4, the harasser from doing the following, all or some of them, and may be subject to the following conditions:
(1) to harass the victim, in any way and in any place;
(2) threaten the victim;
(3) spying on the victim, ambushing him, tracking his movements or actions, or harming his privacy in any other way;
(4) make any contact with the victim orally, in writing, or by any other means;
(5) be at a certain distance from the victim's residence, vehicle, place of work, or place of study or from another place where the victim regularly frequents;
(6) to carry or possess weapons, including weapons given to him on behalf of a security authority or another authority from the state authorities;
And everything, both towards the victim and towards another person close to him, both explicitly and implicitly, both directly and indirectly.
(b) An order to prevent threatening harassment has been issued, which includes a prohibition as stated in subsection (a)(6) –
(1) The court may at the time of issuing the order order the seizure of the weapon of the person bound by the order, immediately;
(2) The court will notify these parties of the issuance of the order:
(a) the licensing official, as defined in the Firearms Law;
(b) Israel Police;
(c) Israel Defense Forces – if the person bound by the order is among the reserve forces of the Israel Defense Forces, or if a weapon was given to him on behalf of the Israel Defense Force or with his consent to possess it, including weapons given to him according to the certificate of authorization as stated in section 5b(c) of the Firearms Law;
(d) Security Authority – the security authority to which the person bound by the order is listed.
(3) In the case of an obligee as defined in paragraph (2)(c) or (d), or a person whose weapon is used by him as part of his work with a special license holder or in an appropriate establishment, the supervisor of the obligee may, either on his own initiative or at the request of the obligee, submit a reasoned request in writing to the court regarding the continued possession and carrying of the weapon by the person bound by the order;For this matter, "special license holder", "proper establishment" and "supervisor" – as defined in section 2c(a)(2) and (3) of the Law on the Prevention of Domestic Violence.
(c) An order to prevent threatening harassment has been issued according to section 4(a) or 4(b), which does not include a prohibition as stated in subsection (a)(6), the court will interpret in its decision the reasons for not including the prohibition in the order.
(d) An order to prevent threatening harassment may also contain a requirement for a bond both for its existence and for good behavior, or any other instruction necessary, in the opinion of the court, to ensure the safety and security of the victim or another person close to him, and may also contain instructions regarding the arrangements required as a result of issuing the order .
(e) The terms of the bond as stated in subsection (d), including forfeiture, will be specified in the order to prevent threatening harassment.
validity period
6. The validity of an order to prevent threatening harassment shall not exceed six months;The court may extend and return and extend the validity of the order, provided that the total period does not exceed one year, however for special reasons that will be detailed in its decision, it may extend and return and extend the validity of the order for a total period not exceeding two years.
procedures
7. (a) A court may issue an order to prevent threatening harassment as one party, if it believes that this is necessary for the immediate protection of the victim's well-being, or when the respondent was duly summoned and did not appear for the hearing.
(b) An order to prevent threatening harassment has been issued in the status of one party, the hearing will be held in the presence of both parties as soon as possible and no later than seven days from the date of the order.
(c) a hearing is scheduled as stated in subsection (b), the court may extend the validity of the order, cancel it or make changes to it, even if the person bound by the order did not appear for the hearing.
(d) A hearing on the request according to section 5(b)(3) will take place in the capacity of both parties and in the capacity of a representative of the holder of the special license, the appropriate enterprise or the security authority, as the case may be.
(e) The court will not reject a request for an order to prevent threatening harassment unless it has given the applicant or his attorney an opportunity to present his arguments orally, unless it considers that there are exceptional circumstances and reasons to be recorded.
Violation of an order
8. (a) If a complaint has been filed with the police about a violation of a threatening harassment prevention order, a police officer may arrest the violator.
(b) This will not be a good defense for those who violated the order to prevent threatening harassment, which the victim or another person close to him, did not insist on its existence or the application of the provisions of the law due to his violation.
Expenses and compensation for an idle application
9. A court rejected a request for an injunction to prevent threatening harassment and determined that it is vexatious, it may impose on the person who requested the injunction the following or some of them:
(1) expenses for the benefit of the state and for the benefit of the injured party, at a rate deemed appropriate;
(2) Adequate compensation to those affected by the submission of the application.
authority
10. In a proceeding according to this law, a court shall not refrain from discussing or deciding on a request to issue an order according to section 4, solely because the matter is clarified in another proceeding, a claim of the lack of local authority has been made, or a person has conditioned his right according to law.
Compliance with laws
11. The provisions of this law are intended to add to the provisions of any law and not to detract from them.
Implementation and regulations
12. The Minister of Justice is in charge of the implementation of this law and he may establish, with the approval of the Knesset's Committee for the Promotion of the Status of Women, regulations regarding its implementation.
13. In the Youth (Care and Supervision) Law, in Section 3A –
(1) In the marginal title, after "protection order" will come "and an order to prevent threatening harassment";
(2) At the end there will be "and also to issue an order to prevent threatening harassment according to the Prevention of Threatening Harassment Law, 5572 2001".
14. In the Law for the Prevention of Domestic Violence –
(1) In section 2, after subsection (h) there will be:
"(h1) A court hearing a request for the granting of a protective order according to the provisions of this law, may also issue an order to prevent threatening harassment to a person, regarding a member of his family, in accordance with the provisions of the Prevention of Threatening Harassment Law, 5772 2001.";
(2) Instead of section 10, the following shall be inserted:
"authority
10. In a proceeding according to this law, a court shall not refrain from discussing or granting relief in the matter, for the sole reason that the matter is clarified in another proceeding, that an allegation of the lack of local authority has been asserted or that a person has conditioned his right according to law."
Examples of judgments issued after an application was submitted for the granting of a restraining order
It is highly recommended to attend a hearing regarding a restraining order with a lawyer who is familiar with the provisions of the law and the relevant rulings.
HT (Petah Tikva) 45630-08-23 Eyal Union v. Moshe Katz
before me is a request for a a restraining order.
The applicant is a CPA, and previously served as a council member and CEO of the Kfar Saba municipality.According to him, the respondent posted on the social network "Facebook", defamatory and offensive publications about him, his family and his late father. According to him, the background for the publications is the desire of the respondent that the applicant stop supporting the election of the mayor of Kfar Saba in the local authority elections.
The postings submitted by the applicant were posted by a profile named "Moses King".The profile page from August 16, 2023, with 4 publications, and from August 15, 2023, with 3 publications, and two additional publications without a date were shown.In a pleading submitted after the one-party hearing, the applicant attached additional publications: 3 publications dated 8/21/2023, 2 publications dated 8/20/2023, as well as a correspondence dated 8/15/2023 of the respondent with the applicant's attorney.
The applicant claimed that he intended to file a defamation lawsuit against the respondent and he attached to his request a letter sent by his attorney to the respondent, in which the applicant demanded that the respondent publish an apology and pay compensation without proof of damage in the amount of NIS 420,000. A confirmation was also attached to the request, according to which the applicant filed a police complaint against the respondent on 8/16 2023.
The publications are allegedly insulting and defamatory, and harm the good name of the applicant, his family and his late father.Thus, among other things, they wrote: "They say you are gay", "Eyal Union is a clean city because you took all the black money from bribes", "Father Union "raped" women, you asked for 420,000, you will get more penetration in prison, finger sticks, cock tools.Your ass will be a hit in the most wanted prison", "Ile Union Your father is sexually ill! Cruelty abuse is in your genes",
"A bad stag cheats on Yuval, his partner for several years.His father beat him and his mother with murderous blows, broke their bones, the crazy cruel genetics inherited from his father", "Eyal Union, the king of bribery who replaced Harfi as the CEO of the city. He built a villa in two years bribed."
The respondent's behavior in the discussion that took place in the presence of both parties was unbridled.The respondent continued his attacks and uttered slurs against the applicant and his attorney.The respondent called in the applicant's face several times "Moshe Katsav", waved an orange cloth or garment, and uttered statements such as "he will come to me in orange".
Although he was asked again and again by the court not to do so, the respondent continuously and disrespectfully lashed out at the words of the applicant's attorney and the court and even blasphemed.The respondent confirmed that he wrote the publications against the applicant, against his mother and against his late father.In his testimony, the respondent continued with curses and accusations against both the applicant and his attorney for accepting bribes.
The respondent submitted at the hearing his correspondence with the applicant starting on June 26, 2023 (exhibit M/1).In the correspondence, the respondent wrote to the applicant a lot of text, most of which is not clear.Between the lines it can be understood that the respondent requests that the applicant not support the local authority elections for the current mayor, but another candidate.
Starting on July 7, 2023, apparently after the respondent realized that the applicant did not respond to his requests, in correspondence dated July 7, 2023 and July 11, 2023, he began defaming the applicant.
Since the respondent continued to use the right of argument given to him at the hearing as a basis for further disparaging the applicant, the court ordered the respondent to finish his words.That's when the respondent started raging in the courtroom.
First he threw sheets of paper at the applicant, and shouted and cursed loudly.He then forcefully pushed the court guard security guard who tried to stop him from reaching the court stage, and threw a framed photo on the court table.At least three security guards of the court guard were required to take control of the respondent and remove him from the courtroom.
In REA 6861/22YospaBarak Tamir v. Dr. Sharon ElRai Price (October 31, 2022), the Honorable Judge D. Barak-Erez stood for the distinction between the purposes of the protection against threatening harassment and the purposes of defamation laws:
"11. …. Indeed, an expression that harms a person's good name may be relevant in cases that comply with both the Law Prohibiting Defamation and the Law for the Prevention of Threatening Harassment. However, while within the scope of the Law Prohibiting Defamation the legal examination focuses on the content of the expression,
against the background of the concern that it Expected to humiliate and humiliate the person concerned in the eyes of humanity, the law to prevent threatening harassment is focused on the continued effect of the expression on the person himself, due to the fact that it threatens him or harms his peace of life, his privacy, his freedom or his body.
Against the background of the aforementioned, it is clear that the scope of this law has It means a lot that the phrase is repeated over and over again. Also, and as its name indicates – the law to prevent threatening harassment is focused on future prevention and hence its importance.
12. If so, there is no room for the assumption that a single-valued "classification" of publications as defamation or threatening harassment is required.As mentioned, there may be situations in which publications will provide grounds for a defamation claim (due to the contempt towards others) and will also serve as grounds for issuing an order to prevent threatening harassment (due to their effect on the person himself).
Alongside them, there may be situations where publications will only fall within the scope of one of the mentioned laws, or not at all.
By way of borrowing, it is possible to mention the metaphor used many years ago by Judge A. Barak, in relation to the scope of the applicability of the various wrongs according to the Torts Ordinance [new version] – explaining that they are not like "magnets of responsibility, in a way that all are within the sphere of attraction of one Injustices have their origin in any case from the sphere of attraction of another wrongdoing",
but to "networks of networks, imposed, one on top of the other… [so that] sometimes a given set of facts is captured by only one network.
Sometimes it is captured by several networks" (p. "A 243/83 Municipality of Jerusalem v. Gordon, P.D. Lt(1) 113, 125 (1985)).The things are true, in the committed changes, even in relation to our case."
In light of the above, as well as in light of the content of the defamatory publications, their scope and frequency, the respondent's publications constitute threatening harassment as defined in Section 2(b)(4) of the Law on the Prevention of Threatening Harassment, 2001.
Apart from the fact that the publications are defamatory, they are repeated over and over again, and the impression is that if The order to prevent threatening harassment will not be granted, the respondent will continue to distribute similar publications. In addition, in view of the behavior described by the respondent, he may harm the peace of life of the applicant.
Therefore, I order that the order given on August 20, 2023 will remain in place and will be in effect for 6 months starting from August 20, 2023.
The applicant's attorney petitioned for the respondent to be required to provide a bond to ensure compliance with the order. At this stage, the court will refrain from granting this relief in anticipation that the respondent will comply with the decision. In any case, as necessary, the applicant will be entitled to submit an appropriate request.
The respondent will pay the applicant the costs of the procedure in the amount of NIS 1,500.
HT (Petah Tikva) 34139-08-23 Daniel Flah v. David Hatz
1. Before applying for an order according to the law to prevent threatening harassment due to violation of her privacy and alleged threats from the respondent.
These are tenants of two adjacent apartments on the same floor in an apartment building in Hod Hasharon.
It will be noted that between the spouse of the applicant and the respondent there is a mutual order to prevent threatening harassment that was given by agreement within the scope of another procedure.
On August 14, 2023, the applicant submitted her application and when she appeared in court as one party, she made a claim against the respondent as follows (page 1 of the protocol, lines 10-20) –
"Every second he looks for us for small things and doesn't turn to my partner. He has a estrangement from my partner. … Because my partner has an estrangement, he turns to me. … He comes and claims that you don't want to leave Gilboa, we bought the house with the best of our money and he tells Nol Leave the house. The man rents the house and keeps coming and making comments and it reminds me of things from the past that I never imagined.
… He installed a camera without the permission of the landlord and without the permission of anything … I want him not to contact me and it scares me."
As a result of the above, an order was issued on one side by the Honorable Judge Hagit Bolmesh and a hearing on the status of the parties was scheduled which took place before as part of the on-call during the recess.
At the beginning of the discussion I tried to bring the parties to an agreement, which in my opinion was to bring about a better result for both of them than any forced solution in a decision, but unfortunately this did not work and therefore the parties were interrogated and their summaries were heard and now the time has come for the decision.
In the applicant's cross-examination, it became clear that the allegations she made against the respondent in the request regarding the existence of mental disorders and his being treated with psychiatric treatments lacked any basis, but even after she was presented with medical records regarding him indicating the absence of any psychiatric findings or treatment, she refused to retract these allegations, although she did not justify her insistence in any way and did not point to any source for their truth.
I will clarify and emphasize immediately that there is no actual existence of a mental disorder or the fact that a person undergoes psychiatric treatment any denial or violation of his rights, but in the fact that precisely after it has been proven to this man that there is no basis for his claims against those who attributed such a mental condition or treatments to him, God continues to insist on attributing them to him. to indicate the negative intention of the attributor.
Even when the applicant was asked in her investigation about the threats she attributed to the respondent, it became clear that this was summed up in the smiles which she interpreted as condescending which were directed mainly at her partner, but since she was with him at the time she saw them as directed at her as well (p. 7 of the protocol lines 10-22) and claimed that she was afraid of following them .
In the questions that the respondent addressed to the applicant in her investigation, he presented her with the claim that the smiles he directed at her partner were mutual and stemmed from the embarrassment involved in a forced meeting between two parties to a mutual order to prevent threatening harassment (ibid., lines 13-15), and without contradicting this claim, the applicant insisted that these smiles were frightening her.
Referring to the claim that he made offers to the applicant and her partner to leave their apartment, the respondent did not deny the very application, but in his cross-examination he claimed that his offer on this subject stemmed from the fact that her partner told him from the first day he arrived at the place – while they still had a normal relationship – that he was suffering from the noise The shared house has many neighbors and therefore the respondent,
who owns a detached house, suggested that he move to it in order to make it easier for him and nothing else (p. 10 of the protocol, lines 4-1).
According to the respondent, this is generally an attempt to help and an act of charity (p. 4 of the protocol lines 27-29 and p. 5 line 33) and should not be considered as a threat or threatening harassment.
As for the issue of invasion of privacy, it became clear that on the day that the respondent installed a camera near the front door of his house, the applicant took a picture of it and hurried to submit her request (ibid., lines 23-29), that is, it is a claim that the very installation of the camera constitutes an invasion of her privacy.
In relation to the installation of the camera, the respondent claimed that since the applicant and her partner had urinated near the door of his apartment, played loud music to disturb him, threatened his wife to refrain from running the classes she holds in their apartment, filmed into his house and made threatening noises every time he entered his apartment,
after he attributed problems to them He is afraid of them and the lack of boundaries on their part, and therefore, after receiving permission from more than 50% of the residents of the building, he installed a camera near the door of his house to protect them from them (p. 8 of the protocol).
The respondent confirmed that the camera can be directed using an applet installed on his mobile phone, but emphasized that it is aimed at the corridor of the building next to the door of his house, without photographing the door of the applicant's apartment and her partner,
and even showed me through his mobile phone the image taken by the camera live as it was directed at the time According to him, the discussion teaches about this (ibid., line 17).
The respondent did not deny that the camera records audio but claimed that the audio quality is poor (ibid., line 32).
Section 2(a) of the Law on the Prevention of Intimidating Harassment states that – "Intimidating harassment is the harassment of a person by another person in any way or making threats against him, under circumstances that give a reasonable basis for assuming that the harasser or the threatener may return and harm the peace of life, privacy or freedom of the person or because he may harm his body" and section 2(b) offers several possible, but not exhaustive, examples of this.
The court has already explained in relation to the foundations required for the existence of grounds for issuing an order to prevent threatening harassment as follows (A.A. (Central Districts) 26728-07-18ShaulAmsterdamski v. Michal Golan Greenberg (25.7.2018) paragraph 21. Emphasis underlined in the original ) –
"The law actually enumerates two elements, the existence of which is the basis for issuing an order to prevent threatening harassment: thefirst element– requires that a person to whom the request is directed has committed harassment in the past, or has made threats against the applicant;
while thesecond element– requires that the circumstances indeed support and establish the conclusion that that personmayharass or threaten to harm the peace of life, privacy, freedom or body of the applicantin the future(Rev. Bara (Districts 10th) 179/04 Nes Shuval v. Miriam Nissim (10.8.2004) at paragraph 20)."
We learn, therefore, that the elements establishing grounds for issuing an order to prevent threatening harassment, as requested in the Didan matter, include both a factual element that has already occurred and will be proven, and an element of a probable conclusion from the circumstances surrounding the proven factual infrastructure.
Aka, in our case the application fails already at the stage of proving the factual basis.
It has not been proven that the respondent made threats towards the applicant, and with all due respect to the smile that she herself confirmed was directed at her partner – especially in light of the reasoning offered by the respondent and her confirmation that it was not actually directed at her but was only understood by her to be aimed at her as well – this does not prove a threat even if I assume for the purpose of this decision that the feeling of fear she testified to is authentic.
I will not deny that it is possible to smile threateningly towards the other person, but it has not been proven that this was the case in our case, even though the burden of proving this rests on the applicant and the respondent's explanation is not unreasonable on its face.
These things are also true in relation to the applicant's claim that the respondent suggested they leave the house.
Even if I don't accept the respondent's explanation that this is an offer that is entirely charitable, I do not believe that even given the friction between neighbors when one claims to make noise or invasion of privacy and the other denies it and claims baseless hypersensitivity on the part of the owner and a history of neighbor disputes with whom Betia has already left a place of residence One
(p. 9 of the protocol, lines 5-3), a statement by one of them to the other that he suggests he leave the house does not necessarily amount to an act of threatening harassment and it is possible that there is an offer to solve the problem – even if a little defiant.
It will be mentioned that since freedom of speech is a protected value in a democratic country and cannot easily be curtailed, even unpleasant discourse between people is still worthy of protection as long as it does not cross the fine line of a threat that arouses fear of future threatening harassment and this was not proven in our case.
Also regarding the allegation of violation of privacy, no violation of privacy has been proven against the applicant as the first element required for the existence of grounds for issuing an order as it has not been proven that the respondent photographed the door of the applicant's house let alone the interior.
It will be mentioned that the relevant definition of invasion of privacy is "photographing a person whilein the individual's possession" (Section 2(3) of the Privacy Protection Law, my emphasis), when even if an invasion of privacy is committed, one of the defenses against a claim for it is when – "…the defendantor the accused did the injury in good faith…to protect a kosher personal interest of the offender" (section 18(a) of the law).
In this context, it will be mentioned that the respondent here claimed that acts of harm to him, his property and his peace were committed and that the installation of the camera was done following these acts and in order to document and exonerate them.
With specific reference to the violation of privacy through the installation of cameras, it was determined in the ruling as follows (TA (Rashl'z) 4620/08OscarAlbert Krasotsky v. Haim Smeder (11/25/2012) paragraph 52. The emphasis is mine and not in the original) –
"…I got the impression that the installation of the hidden camera was done out of a sincere desire to find out the identity of the person causing damage to their property and thus prevent the continuation of acts of vandalism. In doing so, the defendants sought to protect a "kosher personal interest" as stated in Section 18(2)(c) of the Privacy Protection Law.
In this context, it should be noted Because an action taken for the protection of property was recognized by the ruling as a "kosher personal matter" in relation to the tort of defamation… this determination must also be applied regarding the placement of a hidden cameraintendedto record an incident of damage to property or life.
For these reasons, I determine that the installation of the hidden camera by the defendants was done for a proper purpose, the purpose of which is to protect the defendants' proprietary interest.Furthermore, the placement of the hidden camera was done in a manner that does not deviate from what is reasonable, as detailed above.Therefore, the act of photographing does not actually establish a cause for compensation for the plaintiffs by virtue of the Privacy Protection Law."
Here is the place to emphasize that this is not a hidden camera but an open one.
With specific reference to photographing the front of a person's house, it was determined as follows (TA (Y-M Districts) 7236/05 Mordechai Levin v. Avni Ravid(May 15, 2006) paragraph 14) –
"The Privacy Protection Law, 1981, includes a closed list of acts that constitute an infringement of privacy.Photographing the front of a person's house is not one of them…. Even if we take the path of a generous and expansive interpretation, it is not possible to include a ban on publishing a photograph of the front of a person's house;And not for nothing.Adam's house – inside – was his fortress.His front, which faces outwards, is naturally exposed in its creation towards all Alma."
(Regarding photographing a person on the doorstep of his house, see Tel Aviv (Hadera) 30777-04-17IrinaTzoglin v. Meir Malol (14.5.2019) paragraph 55, and also see Tel Aviv (Hadera) 9403-01- 15HaniaPerezberg v. Limor Gilad (November 1, 2015) and more).
It was found that even in relation to this claim of the applicant, the factual basis indicating a violation of the applicant's privacy was not proven.
In the absence of proof of this element, it is understood that the grounds for issuing the requested order do not exist.
It goes without saying that the very claim that it is possible in principle to direct the camera to the applicant's house does not meet the required basis, both in view of the legal determination that photographing the front of the house is not a violation of privacy and, even more so, due to the fact that it determined that a theoretical possibility of a wrongdoing that is not a concern turns out to arise Out of actions carried out by the respondent in the past, an impossible reality of imposing sweeping prohibitions will be created, as far east as west from the law's purpose.
Now as for the claim that the camera also records audio.
It is not impossible that in a certain situation placing a camera that also records audio in the public domain will create a violation of the prohibitions imposed by the wiretapping law, but this is not the case in every situation.
In this regard, one should remember the protected option mentioned in section 8(1)(c) of this law, which deals with listening to a conversation that was made in the public domain if it was made – "randomly and in good faith, in the course of an open recording intended for public publication" (and see the court's comments on this subject in the TAM (Shalom Tel Aviv 6782-12-11DavidKaleb v. Municipality of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa (3.5.2017) paragraph 38 which dealt with hidden cameras – a serious situation in our case).
In this case, no actual recording of a conversation in which the applicant participated has been proven, there is no doubt that the camera is visible – certainly to the applicant – and is placed in the public domain and that to the extent that a conversation in which the applicant participates is recorded, it will be done randomly and according to the respondent for the purpose of documenting vulnerabilities in it that will be used in the proceedings regarding the fact that they are a form of public publication.
The takeaway from the aforementioned rule is that in relation to all of the applicant's claims, the elements required for the existence of a ground for issuing an order to prevent threatening harassment have not been proven.
Therefore, the request is denied.
In view of the aforementioned result, I considered awarding expenses to the applicant's obligation in accordance with what is stated in section 9 of the Prevention of Threatening Harassment Law, but in order not to intensify the friction between the parties by "adding fuel to the fire" and since paying attention to the sensitivity between the parties, it may be possible to accept that the applicant's concern is authentic even if it is unfounded Legally, in the end, I found it appropriate not to make an order for expenses.
Right of appeal to the Center-Lod District Court within 60 days.
